Assistant of Graduate Studies
807 McClung Tower
Knoxville, TN 37996-0480
- Ph.D. Rutgers University, 2017
- M.Sc. Edinburgh University, 2011
- M.A. Edinburgh University, 2009
I specialise in epistemology. My research clusters into five areas. The first is the nature and value of understanding and explanation. The second concerns questions about epistemic virtue, value, and luck. The third area is the ethics of belief and especially the effect of moral considerations on epistemic norms. Fourthly, I examine meta-philosophy and the epistemology of philosophy. Finally, I research social and applied epistemology, especially collective epistemology and legal epistemology.
Recently I have been investigating the epistemology of legal standards of proof and sexual assault accusations.
These key words provide an overview of my research themes:Understanding, explanation, wisdom, evidence, justification, belief, coherence, knowledge, testimony, disagreement, doubt, collective belief, pragmatic encroachment, moral encroachment, epistemic contextualism, stakes, risks, the ethics of belief, the epistemology of statistics, relevant alternatives theory, lottery paradoxes, proof paradoxes, safety, sensitivity, normic support, modal epistemology, epistemic virtue, epistemic luck, epistemic value, the swamping problem, the Meno problem, philosophical judgement, counterexamples, methodology, intuitions, normality conditions, genealogy, teleological approaches, function-first epistemology, Edward Craig, social epistemology, applied epistemology, legal epistemology, feminist epistemology, legal standards of proof, preponderance of evidence, beyond reasonable doubt, statistical evidence, crime statistics, profiling, rape accusations, gaslighting, credibility, epistemic injustice.
Recent, representative publications
- ‘Relevance and Risk: How the Relevant Alternatives Framework Models the Epistemology of Risk’ (forthcoming) Synthese.
- ‘Doubt and Disagreement in the #MeToo Era’ (forthcoming) Feminist Philosophers on #MeToo (working title) ed. Yolonda Wilson. Routledge.
- ‘Legal Evidence and Knowledge’ (forthcoming) The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence, eds. Maria Lasonen-Aarnio and Clayton Littlejohn. Routledge.
- ‘The “She Said, He Said” Paradox and the Proof Paradox’ (forthcoming) Truth and Trials: Dilemmas at the Intersection of Epistemology and Philosophy of Law, eds. Zachary Hoskins and Jon Robson. Routledge.
- ‘Profiling and Proof: Are Statistics Safe?’ (2020) Philosophy 95(2).
- ‘Understanding in Epistemology’ (2020) in ‘Epistemology and Education’, The Encyclopedia of Educational Theory and Philosophy, ed. Michael A Peters. Springer.
- ‘The Reasonable and the Relevant: Legal Standards of Proof’ (2019) Philosophy & Public Affairs 47(3): 288–318.
- ‘Wisdom and Adversity: The Potential Role of Humility’ (2019) with Tenelle Porter, Don E. Davis, and Jason Baehr, The Journal of Value Inquiry 53 (3): 475–477.
- ‘Legal Epistemology’ (2019) Oxford Bibliographies: Philosophy, ed. Duncan Pritchard. Oxford University Press.
- ‘Virtue Epistemology and Explanatory Salience’ (2018) The Routledge Handbook of Virtue Epistemology, ed. Heather Battaly. Routledge, 296–308.
- ‘Legal Burdens of Proof and Statistical Evidence’ (2018) The Routledge Handbook of Applied Epistemology, eds. David Coady and James Chase. Routledge, 171–195.
- ‘Evidentialism and Moral Encroachment’ (2018) Believing in Accordance with the Evidence: New Essays on Evidentialism, ed. Kevin McCain. Springer, 169–195.
- ‘In Defence of Reasonable Doubt’ (2017) Journal of Applied Philosophy 34(2): 221–241.
- ‘Safety’s Swamp: Against the Value of Modal Stability’ (2017) American Philosophical Quarterly 54(2): 119–129.
- ‘Coherence Without Conservation’ (2016) invited book symposium contribution on Reason and Explanation by Ted Poston, Syndicate Philosophy.
- ‘Normalcy and the Contents of Philosophical Judgements’ (2015) Inquiry 58(7): 700–740.
- ‘Teleologies and the Methodology of Epistemology’ (2015) Epistemic Evaluation: Purposeful Epistemology, eds. John Greco and David Henderson. Oxford University Press, 31–45.
- ‘The Commutativity of Evidence: A Problem for Conciliatory Views of Peer Disagreement’ (2014) Episteme 11(1): 83–95.
- ‘Understanding, Integration, and Epistemic Value’ (2012) Acta Analytica 27(2): 163–181.