I work primarily in epistemology and philosophy of action.

Book

Luck: Its Nature and Significance for Human Knowledge and Agency (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan [2015]), pp. xii + 202

Selected Articles, Chapters, & Reviews (see CV for full publication list)

• “The Consequence Argument and Ordinary Human Agency,” Synthese 203, 96 (2024): 1-11
• “Norms of Belief and Knowledge from Non-Knowledge,” in Illuminating Errors: New Essays on Knowledge from Non-Knowledge, eds. Rodrigo Borges and Ian Schnee (New York: Routledge [2023]), 11-27
• “Involuntarism Impugned?” Synthese 200, 362 (2022): 1-11
• “Unsettledness and the Intentionality of Practical Decisions,” Philosophical Explorations 25 (2022): 220-231
• “Is Fallible Knowledge Attributable?” Acta Analytica 37 (2022): 73-8
• “Blameworthiness, Willings, and Practical Decisions,” Philosophical Inquiries 9 (2021): 49-56
• “Moral Blameworthiness, Quality of Will, and Akratic Action,” The Journal of Value Inquiry 54 (2020): 365-370
• “Practical Decision and the Cognitive Requirements for Blameworthiness,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 43 (2019): 119-135
•  “Do We Decide Intentionally?” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (2018): 822-827
• “Gettiered Belief,” in Explaining Knowledge: New Essays on the Gettier Problem, eds. Rodrigo Borges, Claudio de Almeida, and Peter Klein (Oxford: Oxford University Press [2017]), 15-34
• “Incompatibilist Commitment and Moral Self-Knowledge: The Epistemology of Libertarianism,” Philosophical Issues 26 (2016): 78-98
• “Review of Ishtiyaque Haji’s Luck’s Mischief: Obligation and Blameworthiness on a Thread,” Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 3 May 2016 (http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/66653-lucks-mischief-obligation-and-blameworthiness-on-a-thread/)
• “Strokes of Luck,” in The Philosophy of Luck, eds. D. Pritchard and L. Whittington (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell [2015]), 27-58
• “Lenient Accounts of Warranted Assertability,” in Epistemic Norms: New Essays on Action, Belief and Assertion, eds. Clayton Littlejohn and John Turri (Oxford: Oxford University Press [2014]), 33-58
• “Can Virtue Epistemology Capitalize on JTB’s Appeal?” Philosophical Issues 23 (2013): 199-222
• “Review of Ernest Sosa’s Knowing Full Well,” The Philosophical Review 122 (2013): 135-139
• “Conciliationism and Uniqueness” (with Nathan Ballantyne), Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (2012): 657-670
• “Uniqueness, Evidence, and Rationality” (with Nathan Ballantyne), Philosophers’ Imprint 11/18 (2011): 1-13
• “Does Knowledge Secure Warrant to Assert?” Philosophical Studies 154 (2011): 285-300
• “Two Claims about Epistemic Propriety,” Synthese 181 (2011): 471-488
• “Omniprescience and Tough Choices,” Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 3 (2011): 41-54
• “The Fall of the Mind Argument and Some Lessons about Freedom” (with Donald Smith), in Action, Ethics and Responsibility, eds. Joseph Campbell, Michael O’Rourke, and David Shier (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press [2010]), 127-147
• “Misleading Dispositions and the Value of Knowledge,” Journal of Philosophical Research 35 (2010): 241-258
• “How (Not) to Attack the Luck Argument,” Philosophical Explorations 13 (2010): 157-166
• “Review of Walter Sinnott-Armstrong’s Moral Skepticisms,” Faith and Philosophy 27 (2010): 355-359
• “Does Luck Exclude Control?” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (2009): 499-504
• “Warrant without Truth?” Synthese 162 (2008): 173-194
• “Thinking about Luck,” Synthese 158 (2007): 385-398
• “Alfred Mele’s Metaphysical Freedom?” (with Ted Warfield), Philosophical Explorations 10 (2007): 185-194
• “Three Arguments against Foundationalism: Arbitrariness, Epistemic Regress, and Existential Support” (with Daniel Howard-Snyder), Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (2006): 535-564
• “Defending Klein on Closure and Skepticism,” Synthese 151 (2006): 257-272
• “Deliberation and Metaphysical Freedom” (with Ted Warfield), Midwest Studies in Philosophy XXIX: Free Will and Moral Responsibility (2005): 25-44
• “On Making an Effort,” Philosophical Papers 33 (2004): 11-21