M.A., Philosophy, University of Milan, 110/110 summa cum laude

Dissertation: Naturalizing Kripkenstein: How Dispositional, Primitivist, and Skeptical Answers to Kripke’s Wittgenstein All Fit within an Evolutionary Account of Meaning (Theoretical Philosophy, Professors Andrea Guardo and Paolo Spinicci)

M.A., Philosophy, King’s College London

Exchange student for the academic year 2019/2020

Teacher Training FOR24

Qualified to teach History and Philosophy in Secondary Education institutions.

B.A., Philosophy, University of Milan, 110/110

Capstone: Reason and other Paradoxes in Robert Fogelin’s “Walking the Tightrope of Reason” (Theoretical Philosophy, Professor Paolo Spinicci)

Here is a list of works in progress and ideas I am currently focusing my research on:

MAIN PROJECTS:

• How is Pereboom’s Free Will Skepticism a Form of Skepticism?: I provide a general taxonomy of the term “skepticism” as used in different areas of philosophy, and show that all -apparently very different- understandings of the term have one core commitment in common. I then apply the finding to the free will skepticism debate, and show that Derk Pereboom’s use of the term in reference to his view is problematic. This was approved as my “Bridge Paper” for the PhD Philosophy Program at UTK.
• Epistemic Implications for Metaphysical Theories: I am in the very early stages of developing a project for my final doctoral dissertation. My intention is to develop and defend a metaphilosophical view that gives great importance to the epistemic implications of metaphysical theories in assessing their ultimate viability. In short, if a certain metaphysical account of X implies that we can know that X exists, this is a major indication that such theory should be preferred over a competing theory that does not allow this implication. Once laid out, I intend to explore this methodology in debates on global metaphysics, free will and  meta-ethics.

SIDE-PROJECTS:

• Finishing Videogames: I believe that part of the uniqueness of the videogame medium consists in the plurality of “finishing conditions” different videogames feature. Unlike movies, songs, and novels, videogames do not have a one-size-fits-all finishing condition. In this project, I explore the different ways in which videogames can be (or cannot be!) finished, and discuss the major implications this discovery has on the metaphysics of videogames as a distinct form of art and entertainment, and on the justification of our aesthetic judgments on videogames.
• Is your partner “the one”?: I am considering the rationality of beliefs such as “My partner is the one”, where “the one” is intended in the popular sense of, roughly, “being THE right person to spend one’s romantic life with”. The philosophical problem arises when considering that it seems epistemically irresponsible to believe that the one person one is in a romantic relationship with is one’s best fit out of billions of people on Earth. I offer an account that purports to explain why in many cases this belief is, surprisingly, actually rational.

• “Dario Vaccaro on Analytic vs Continental Philosophy and Reliability in Knowledge”, The Philosopher’s Nest Podcast, November 2022 (https://open.spotify.com/episode/ 2o6NsBRzUp0MWsiiOPTgyL?si=1396f7089cea4086)
• “Kantian Fallibilism vs Kantian Infallibilism: An Analysis”, Tennessee Philosophical Association, Vanderbilt University (Nashville, TN) – 10/21/2023
• “G. E. Moore’s Naturalistic Fallacy”, Binghamton University Graduate Conference, Binghamton University (Binghamton, NY) – 11/03/2023
• “Epistemic Overshooting”, The Inquiry Network (online workshop for academic researchers in epistemology) – 11/29/2023
• “Epistemic Privilege, Testimonial Evidence, and Disability”, presented as part of the panel “(Dis)Ability Studies”, Women and Gender Studies 50th Anniversary Conference, University of South Carolina (Columbia, SC) – 01/20/2024
• “Williamson’s Epistemology and Knowledge from Falsehood”, 45th Annual UIUC Graduate Conference, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign (Urbana-Champaign, IL) – 04/06/2024
• “Epistemic Privilege, Testimonial Evidence, and Disability”, Australasian Association of Philosophy Conference – 10/16/2024